This paper studies the "overpriced puts puzzle" -the finding that historical prices of the S&P 500 put options have been too high and incompatible with the canonical asset-pricing models, such as CAPM and Rubinstein (1976) model. Simple trading strategies that involve selling at-the-money and out-of-the-money puts would have earned extraordinary profits. To investigate whether put returns could be rationalized by another, possibly nonstandard equilibrium model, we implement a new methodology. The methodology is "model-free" in the sense that it requires no parametric assumptions on investors' preferences. Furthermore, the methodology can be applied even when the sample is affected by certain selection biases (such as the Peso problem) and when investors' beliefs are incorrect.
Introduction
Historical returns of the US equity put options are puzzling. Over the period from 08/1987 to 12/2000, put options on the S&P 500 futures appear to be grossly overpriced. For example, Table 1 reports that puts with one month to maturity have highly negative and statistically significant excess returns. The average excess return is -39% per month for at-the-money (ATM) puts and is -95% per month for deep out-of-the-money (OTM) puts. This implies that selling unhedged puts would have resulted in extraordinary paper profits over the sample period. Other striking findings about historical put returns are that:
• The Jensen's alpha for ATM puts is -23% per month and highly significant. Other popular measures like the Sharpe ratio, the Treynor's measure, the M-squared measure also indicate that put prices have been very high.
• For ATM puts to break even (i.e., to have the average excess return of zero), crashes of the magnitude experienced in October 1987 would have to occur 1.3 times per year.
• The economic impact of the put mispricing appears to be substantial. We estimate the cumulative wealth transfer from buyers to sellers of the S&P 500 futures options and find it to be astounding $18 bln over the studied period.
There is no arguing that selling naked puts could be very risky. For example, a short position in ATM put has a highly asymmetric payoff profile, with limited upside and essentially unlimited downside. Such a position makes a small profit most of the time, but takes a big loss once in a while. Furthermore, the position makes money in good states of the world and loses money in bad states. Because puts are negatively correlated with the market, it is not surprising that they are traded at negative risk premiums. Moreover, because of considerable leverage, the magnitude of those risk-premiums is expected to be large.
While it is clear that option traders will only sell puts when properly rewarded for bearing substantial risks, it is much less clear what their normal risk compensation should be. Stated differently, is about 40% per month represents a "fair" return for a short position in ATM puts? Or, perhaps, it is too high. The answer to this question depends on the assumed equilibrium model, as different models predict different risk premiums. In this paper, we initially consider two candidate asset pricing models -CAPM and Rubinstein (1976) -and argue that historical put prices are far too high to be compatible with those canonical models. This does not immediately mean that option markets are irrational, for it is possible that there is another, nonstandard equilibrium model which could rationalize the empirical findings.
We explore three natural explanations for the "overpriced puts" anomaly:
E1: Risk premium. According to this explanation, high prices of puts are expected and reflect normal risk premiums under some equilibrium model. Even though the standard models cannot explain the data, maybe there is another model which can. In this "true" model, investors strongly dislike negative returns of the S&P 500 Index and are willing to pay hefty premiums for portfolio insurance offered by puts.
E2:
The Peso problem. According to this explanation, the sample under investigation is affected by the Peso problem. The Peso problem refers to a situation when a rare but influential event could have reasonably happened but did not happen in the sample.
To illustrate this explanation, suppose that market crashes (similar to that of October 1987) occur on average once in 5 years. Suppose also that investors correctly incorporate a probability of another crash in option prices. However, since only one market crash has actually happened over the studied 14-year period, the ex post realized returns of the Index are different from investors' ex ante beliefs. In this case, puts only appear overpriced. The mispricing would have disappeared if data for a much longer period were available.
E3: Biased beliefs. According to this explanation, investors' subjective beliefs are mistaken. Similar to E2, this explanation states that the Index realized returns have not been anticipated by investors.
Consider an example. Suppose that the true probability of a crash in a given year is 20%, but investors incorrectly believe that this probability is 40%. Since investors overstate probabilities of negative returns, puts (especially OTM puts) are too expensive.
To test whether explanations E1-E3 have merit, we implement a new methodology proposed in Bondarenko (2003a) . The methodology can best be explained on a simple example.
Consider a finite-horizon, pure-exchange economy with a single risky asset, traded in a frictionless market on dates t = 0, 1, . . . , T . The asset's price is v t , and the risk-free rate is zero. There exists a representative investor who maximizes the expected value of the utility function U (v T ). Let Z t denote the value of a general derivative security with a single payoff Z T at time-T . The security's price satisfies the standard restriction:
where m t = E t [m T ] is the pricing kernel, and E t [·] is the objective expectation. Traditional tests of the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) are based on the restriction in (1). In those tests, one must pre-commit to a specific pricing kernel, which is usually obtained from a parametric equilibrium model. As a result, tests suffer from a joint hypothesis problem: rejections may emerge because the market is truly inefficient or because the assumed model is incorrect. Bondarenko (2003a) shows that, under fairly general conditions, securities prices must satisfy another martingale restriction. Let h t (v T ) denote the conditional risk-neutral density (RND) of the asset's final price. Then securities prices deflated by RND evaluated at the final price are martingales:
where E v t [·] := E t [· |ṽ T = v] denotes the expectation conditional on the final price being v. Intuitively, the restriction in (2) says the following. Suppose that the empiricist observes many repetitions of the same environment and selects only price histories for whichṽ T = v. Then, in those histories the ratio Z t /h t (v) must change over time unpredictably. 1 Note that the restriction assumes that time-series of h t (v T ) is available to the empiricist. Despite the fact that RND is not directly observable in financial markets, it is implicit in securities prices. In particular, RND can be estimated from prices of traded options, such as standard calls with different strikes.
Historical Option Returns
This section documents the overpriced puts puzzle. We start by establishing the framework. Then, we discuss the data and report the empirical results.
Preliminaries
Let v t denote time-t value of the S&P 500 Index. We will study historical returns of options written on the Index. Therefore, let P (K) = P (K, T ; v t , t) and C(K) = C(K, T ; v t , t) be the prices of European put and call with strike K and maturity T . To simplify exposition, we assume throughout the paper that the risk-free rate is zero and that S&P 500 does not pay dividends. 3 The option prices can be computed using the risk-neutral density (RND):
where h(v T ) = h(v T , T ; v t , t) is RND. RND satisfies the relationship first discovered in Ross (1976) , Breeden and Litzenberger (1978) , Banz and Miller (1978) :
This relationship allows one to estimate RND from a cross-section of traded options with different strikes. Several alternative techniques for RND estimation have been recently proposed. See Jackwerth (1999) for a literature survey. In this paper, we utilize a new method developed in Bondarenko (2000 Bondarenko ( , 2003b .
In empirical tests, we will group options according to their moneyness. Let k := K/v t denote the strike-to-underlying ratio, or moneyness. Consequently, a put (call) is
• at-the-money (ATM) if k = 1;
• in-the-money (ITM) if k > 1 (k < 1).
It will be convenient to scale option prices by the value of the underlying. Let p(k) := P (K)/v t and c(k) := C(K)/v t denote the normalized put and call.
In the absence of arbitrage opportunities, there exists a pricing kernel m > 0 such that
where r i is the net return of a generic security over the holding period [t, T ] . (That is, the corresponding gross return is R i = 1 + r i .) In particular, r p (k) and r c (k) are the net returns on the normalized options, while r m = v T /v t − 1 is the net return on S&P 500 (interpreted in this paper as the market portfolio). Recall that all returns are already in excess of the risk-free rate and account for S&P 500 dividends.
3 In reality the risk-free rate is nonzero and S&P 500 does pay dividends. However, in the empirical tests, we convert spot prices of all securities into forward prices (for delivery at time-T ). Forward prices are obtained by adjusting spot prices for the risk-free rate and dividends (when applicable). For example, the forward put price
is the spot price and r f is the risk-free rate over [t, T ] . When discussing the theory, this convention allows us to abstract from the difference between the S&P 500 value vt and the S&P 500 futures price Ft. A similar approach has been used in Dumas, Fleming, and Whaley (1998) .
CME Options
Our data consist of daily prices of options on the S&P 500 futures traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) and the S&P 500 futures themselves. The data are obtained from the Futures Industry Institute. The S&P 500 futures have four different maturity months from the March quarterly cycle. The contract size is $250 times S&P 500 futures price (before November 1997, the contract size was $500 times S&P 500 futures price). On any trading day, the CME futures options are available for six unique maturity months: four months from the March quarterly cycle and two additional nearby months ("serial" options). The options contract size is one S&P 500 futures. The minimum price movement, or the tick size, is 0.05. The strikes are multiples of 5 for near-term months and multiples of 25 for longer maturities. If at any time the S&P 500 futures contract trades through the highest or lowest strike available, additional strikes are usually introduced.
The sample period in this study is from August 1987 through December 2000. Data for earlier years are not used for two reasons. First, the option market was considerably less liquid during its earlier years. Second, prior to August 1987, options were available only for quarterly maturity months (i.e., only 4 maturities per year). Our analysis requires sets of options which expire each month.
The CME options on the S&P 500 futures and options on the S&P 500 index itself, traded on the Chicago Board Option Exchange (CBOE), have been a focus of numerous empirical studies. For short maturities, prices of the CME and CBOE options are virtually indistinguishable. Nevertheless, there are a number of practical advantages in using the CME options:
• As well known, there is a 15-minute difference between the close of the CBOE markets and the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ markets, where the components of S&P 500 are traded. This difference leads to the non-synchronicity biases between the closing prices of the options and S&P 500. In contrast, the CME options and futures close at the same time (3:15 pm CT).
• It is easier to hedge options using very liquid futures as opposed to trading the 500 individual stocks. On the CME, futures and futures options are traded in pits side by side. This arrangement facilitates hedging, arbitrage, and speculation. It also makes the market more efficient. In fact, even traders of the CBOE options usually hedge their positions with the CME futures.
• Because S&P 500 pays dividends, to estimate RNDs from the CBOE options, one needs to make some assumptions about the Index dividend stream. No such assumptions are needed in the case of the CME futures options.
A disadvantage of the CME options is their American-style feature. However, we conduct our empirical analysis in such a way that the effect of the early exercise is minimal. Figure 1 provides some descriptive statistics of the data. It plots the average daily trading volume and open interest for different k, when time to maturity τ = T − t is 1-28 days, 29-56 days, and 57-84 days. The figure illustrates several important features of the data:
(a) The trading activity is relatively light for large τ , but increases considerably as the maturity date approaches. This holds for both trading volume and open interest.
(b) The trading is the heaviest in options with k close to 1. The trading is generally higher in OTM options than in ITM options.
(c) For k < 1, puts are more liquid than calls, while the opposite is true for k > 1. Among far-from-the-money options, the trading is more active in OTM puts as opposed to OTM calls. This is consistent with the fact that portfolio managers demand OTM puts to hedge their portfolios against stock market declines.
To construct our final dataset we follow several steps, which are explained in Appendix A. In brief, these steps include filtering the option data, forming normalized prices of European puts and calls, and estimating RNDs.
Overpriced Puts Puzzle
In this subsection we examine historical returns of puts and calls. To build as large a series of non-overlapping returns as possible, we focus on short-term options with one month left to expiration. Table 1 contains a variety of statistics for different strike-to-underlying ratio k. The table is produced in the following way:
• Let j index different options maturities T j in the sample. We compute returns of options that mature on T j over the holding period [t j , T j ], where t j = T j−1 . In other words, we consider a rollover trading strategy for which, as soon as one set of options expires, new short-term options are purchased and held until they expire the following month. 4 Overall, there are N = 161 one-month holding periods in the sample. (Because there are only 5 option maturities in 1987, N =5+13·12=161.) For each holding period, we compute the net returns r p (k), r c (k), and r m for puts, calls, and the underlying futures.
• On trading date t j , we classify options according to their strike-to-underlying ratio into equally-spaced bins with centers at k = 0.94, 0.96, 0.98, 1.00, 1.02, 1.04, 1.06. Typically, several strikes fall in a given bin. In this case, we select one strike that is the closest to the center of the bin. Thus, there is a maximum of one strike per bin per trading period.
• In Table 1 , we report mean, minimum, median, and maximum of r p (k) and r c (k) for bins with different k. (In all tables, return statistics are reported as monthly and in decimal form. They are not annualized.) The pointwise confidence intervals (1%, 5%, 95%, and 99%) are constructed using a bootstrap with 1000 resamples.
To ensure that the results are not driven by a few extreme returns on low-priced, illiquid options, we do not use option prices lower than 0.5% of the underlying. For example, if v t =1000, we consider puts and calls no cheaper than $5 ($1,250 per option contract). Because of this filter, the number of available returns n may be less than N = 161 for some moneyness, especially for OTM options.
The average put return monotonically increases with k. AR is negative and highly significant for all k. In particular, AR is -39% per month for very liquid ATM puts and is -95% per month for less liquid OTM puts with k = 0.94. For calls, AR is generally positive but not statistically significant. (The confidence intervals are very wide for OTM calls, reflecting a high variability of their returns.) Figure 2 provides additional insights by comparing two probability densities: the aggregate risk-neutral density (ARND) and the unconditional objective density (OD). OD is estimated using the kernel method from N returns of the underlying. 5 ARND is computed as the pointwise average of N individual RNDs, as functions of moneyness k. Both densities correspond to one-month holding period.
The main differences between the two densities are as follows. Relative to OD, ARND has (i) lower mean, (ii) higher standard deviation, (iii) fatter left tail, and (iv) higher kurtosis. The most pronounced are differences (i) and (iii). In particular, the mean of ARND is lower than the mean of OD by 0.71% (annualized 8.57%). Furthermore, the mean of ARND is located noticeably to the left from its mode. This points to substantial negative skewness of ARND. Differences (i) and (iii) are the primary reasons for negative put returns.
The bottom panel of Figure 2 plots the normalized put and call prices corresponding to ARND and OD. Option prices are obtained by integrating the two densities against option payoffs. The ARND-implied prices may be interpreted as the average option prices over the studied period, while the OD-implied prices may be interpreted as the fair prices computed under the assumptions that 1) investors were risk-neutral, and 2) investors correctly anticipated the distribution of r m . For all k, the ARND-implied puts are more expensive than the ODimplied ones. In relative terms, the mispricing is the most pronounced for OTM puts, the finding consistent with Table 1 . For calls, the ARND-implied prices are lower than the ODimplied prices, except for very high k when the two sets of prices are essentially the same. 6
To save on space, in what follows we report the empirical results for puts only. For calls, the results are less anomalous and are available upon request.
In Figure 3 , we examine whether the results for puts are robust over different subsamples. Specifically, we partition the sample period into four subperiods: 08/87-06/90, 07/90-12/93, 01/94-06/97, and 07/97-12/00. For these subperiods, we report AR for k=0.96, 0.98, 1.00, 1.02, 1.04. For comparison, we also show time-series of the level of the S&P 500 Index and the one-month ATM implied volatility. AR is significantly negative for all subperiods and all k. Predictably, the worst subperiod for selling puts is the first one, which includes the October 1987 market crash. However, even for that "bad" subperiod, AR ranges from -27% to -12% per month for different k. For the next three subperiods, the average returns are generally much lower. As expected, put returns are particularly low in years when the stock market performed well, such as in the second and third subperiods. Typically, AR monotonically increases with k (the only exception being k = 0.96 in the first subperiod). Figure 4 shows the distribution of put returns over time, for three most liquid puts with k=0.98, 1.00, and 1.02. The figure confirms the intuition that put returns exhibit substantial positive skewness. Consider, for example, the ATM put. It expires worthless most of the time, but delivers a high positive return once in a while. The OTM put with k=0.98 has an even more skewed distribution of returns: it expires out-of-the-money even more frequently, but when it does mature in-the-money, returns are more extreme. Figure 4 reveals that skewness increases as puts become more out-of-the-money, which is consistent with the evidence in Table 2 .
The fact that puts appear to be overpriced has been noted in a number of recent papers (see the literature review in Section 2.5). In following Sections 2.3.1-2.3.4, we document several new observations which suggest that the magnitude of the put mispricing might have been not fully appreciated.
5 The bandwidth for the kernel method is set to 1.06σN −1/5 , whereσ is the sample standard deviation. 6 For ease of interpretation, the plot shows the no-arbitrage bounds p(k) ≥ (k − 1) + and c(k) ≥ (1 − k) + . These bounds are only relevant for the ARND-implied prices, because the mean of OD is not equal to 1.
Risk-adjustment
First, we examine whether put returns can be justified by some standard asset pricing models. We consider two popular candidates -the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and Rubinstein (1976) model. Under CAPM, the pricing kernel depends on the market return r m as Table 2 reports the alpha and beta coefficients for puts with different moneyness k. For any return r i , alpha and beta are computed as
CAPM is strongly rejected. For k ≤ 1.0, the Jensen's alpha is negative and significant at the 1% level. In particular, α is -23% per month for the ATM put and is even lower for the OTM puts. CAPM performs better for high k. This is not surprising, because a long position in a deep ITM put is akin to a short position in the underlying. As expected, put betas are negative and very large in absolute terms, reflecting both negative correlation with the market and substantial leverage. Put betas display a U -shaped pattern with respect to k.
High leverage of puts complicates interpretation of their alpha coefficients. Therefore, Table 2 also reports several risk-adjusted measures that are unaffected by leverage:
• the Sharpe ratio, SR :=
• M-squared of Modigliani and Modigliani (1997) 
For all k, the Sharpe ratio for selling puts is higher than the Sharpe ratio for the market. The difference is considerable in the case of ATM and OTM puts. The Treynor's measure monotonically increases as k decreases. In economic terms, the Treynor's measure is very large for ATM and OTM puts. Similarly, ATM and OTM puts appear substantially overpriced according to the M 2 measure. (Intuitively, M 2 shows the return that an investor would have earned if a particular position had been diluted or leveraged to match the standard deviation on the market portfolio.)
It is well-known that the Sharpe ratio and related measures can be misleading when returns exhibit substantial skewness. See, for example, Goetzmann, Ingersoll, Spiegel, and Welch (2002) . Therefore, as alternative risk-adjustment, we now consider the Rubinstein model. In this model, the pricing kernel depends on the market return r m as
where γ > 0 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion of the representative investor. For different k, we find the coefficient γ such that
The results are reported in Table 2 . The important observation is that no single γ can simultaneously explain put returns across all levels of moneyness. Generally, γ increases as k decreases; γ ranges from a reasonable value of 4.3 for deep ITM puts to a very large value of 131 for deep OTM puts. For comparison, γ for the market return is 4.3.
The specification in (5) has also been investigated in Coval and Shumway (2001) . They study zero-beta straddles on the S&P 500 index options (CBOE) with moneyness k close to 1.0. Using weekly returns and the sample period from 01/1990 to 10/1995, Coval and Shumway report the estimates of γ from 5.68 to -6.68.
Extreme returns
In Table 3 we study how sensitive the overpriced puts puzzle to extreme observations by examining periods with the highest put returns in the sample. These periods correspond to option maturities in the following five months: It is somewhat surprising that period (b), which includes the October 87 crash, was not the worst month for selling puts -in fact, it was only the forth worst after periods (a), (c), and (e). Even though the decline in the underlying was the largest (-14%) over period (b), puts were selling at unusually high prices at the beginning of the period (as evidenced by the corresponding ATM volatility in Table 3 ). The market was very volatile and put premiums were high because the S&P 500 had already fell substantially in the previous month. In periods (a), (c), and (e), the returns in the underlying were less dramatic (-11%, -10%, -9%). However, they happened after relatively calm periods, when puts were inexpensive by historical measures.
It is clear from Table 3 that put sellers may occasionally incur huge losses. One could argue, therefore, that if these extreme losses had happened in the sample more frequently, then the profitability of selling puts might have disappeared.
To explore this possibility, we compute how many extreme observations must be added to the empirical distribution of put returns to make the average return become zero. Specifically, for each k we add to the sample l = l(k) identical returns corresponding to the October 87 crash (i.e., period (b) above) so that the new average return is zero. The results are reported in Table 4 . For example, about l=18 additional October 87 returns (=346%) are needed for ATM puts to break even. This corresponds to about 1.3 crashes a year! 7
We repeat the same exercise but now add artificial returns equal to the highest return from periods (a)-(e), which may be different for different k. For example, the highest ever return 7 Jackwerth (2000) conducts a similar analysis. He studies returns for the S&P 500 index option (CBOE) over the period from 10/1988 to 12/1995 and finds that, in order to make the alpha coefficient for selling the ATM put and OTM put (k=0.95) equal zero, artificial 20% crashes have to be added one in about every 4 years. The results in Table 4 seem to be even more extreme. To make AR equal zero, crashes of the October 87 magnitude have to happen one in about 9 months. of the ATM put was in period (c) (=540%) and 12 such returns must be added to the sample before the average return becomes zero. 8
Bull market?
Buying put options is a bearish strategy. That is, put returns are low when the market performs well and vice versa. Over the sample period, the level of the S&P 500 Index has risen more than 4 times, from v 0 =314.59 to v T * =1312.15. Is it possible, therefore, that selling puts was so profitable simply because of the unprecedented bull market of the late nineties? In other words, maybe selling puts would not work in downward trending markets?
To explore this possibility, we perform another exercise. We introduce a negative drift for the S&P 500 Index and compute the value of the drift that would reconcile the historical put returns. Specifically, we replace the true process for the S&P 500 Index v t with the modified processv t = v t e −ηt for some constant η > 0. This implies that the return on the underlying futures r m over the period [t, T ] is reduced to 1 +r m = (1 + r m )e −η (T −t) . Using the modified returns on the underlying, we then recompute put returns for all holding periods as well as the average returns. For each k, the average return monotonically and continuously increases as η increases. This observation allows us to find the critical value of η that makes the average return equal zero. The results are reported in Table 5 , which reveals that a negative drift of -1.5% per month is necessary for the ATM put to break even. Assuming this drift, the final value of the S&P 500 Index at the end of the sample period v T * would have been only 111.9 instead of 1312.15! For 2% and 4% OTM puts, the necessary drifts are -2.0% and -2.7% per month, with the corresponding final values of S&P 500 being only 47.8 and 13.3, respectively.
(Intuitively, Sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 look at different characteristics of the empirical distribution for r m and r p (k). In the former, we modify the empirical distribution of put returns by increasing the frequency of most influential observations. In the latter, we shift the mean of the distribution for the market return to the left, without changing the distribution's higher moments. This is consistent with the intuition in Merton (1980) , who points out that estimating the mean of the empirical distribution is more difficult than estimating the standard deviation. The latter approach gradually increases all put returns, until the condition AR=0 is satisfied.)
Overall, Table 5 implies that one would need to introduce a highly implausible drift to justify historical put returns. This also suggests that the exceptional bull market of the nineties cannot be the main reason for the put puzzle. In fact, the mispricing that can be attributed to the bull market is likely to be very small. For example, even if we choose the drift η so that the risk premium of the S&P 500 futures over the 14-year period is zero (i.e., the market earns on average just the risk-free rate), then monthly AR for puts with k = 0.94, . . . , 1.06 are still very low: -0.89, -0.49, -0.41, -0.21, -0.09, -0.03, and -0.003, respectively.
Wealth transfer
The economic impact of the put mispricing is likely to be considerable, due to high trading volume of the S&P 500 options. We can obtain a rough estimate of the economic impact by computing the total profit or loss (P&L) from holding long put positions. For t < s, let P L t,s denote P&L from all put positions over the period [t, s] :
where P L t,t+1 denotes the daily profit or loss. To compute P L t,t+1 , we aggregate P&L of individual puts with all available strikes and all maturities from 1 to 365 days. (P&L of a particular put is the price change over [t, t+1] times the time-t open interest, or (
Intuitively, P L t,s shows the amount of wealth transfered between put buyers and put sellers over the period [s, t] , subject to two simplifying assumptions that 1) all traders can be divided into either buyers (who only hold long puts) or sellers (who only hold short puts), 9 and 2) each day, options are traded at the settlement prices. We report the cumulative wealth transfer P L t,s for the entire period, as well as the four subperiods:
08/87-06/90 07/90-12/93 01/94-06/97 07/97-12/00 Full sample
-0.1 bln -2.3 bln -6.5 bln -8.9 bln -17.8 bln
Over the whole period, put buyers have lost to put sellers astounding $17.8 bln. 10 However, the economy-wide impact of the put mispricing is likely to be even larger considering that
• in addition to the CME options, there exist a number of other options based on broad market indexes. CBOE, CME, CBOT, and other exchanges list options on various indexes, their futures, and related Exchange-Traded Funds (ETFs). Trading in many of these contracts is very actively, including options based on S&P 100, S&P 500, S&P MidCap 400, Russel 2000, DJIA, NASDAQ 100, and others.
• in addition to options on market indexes, there are numerous options on individual stocks. Puts on individual stocks also appear overpriced.
Robustness of Findings
The findings reported in Section 2.3 are not sensitive to a variety of checks in the empirical methodology. In particular, the results are not affected when we 1) use option closing prices instead of settlement prices, and 2) modify the filtering criteria. In an earlier version, we excluded year 1987 from the sample. Naturally, the exclusion of the October 87 crash has the effect of making the average put returns even lower, however, not much lower. As follows from Section 2.3.2, the put anomaly is not driven by a few extreme observations. It should be also noted that the results cannot be explained by the transaction costs or bid-ask spreads. This is because we focus on buy-and-hold strategies that involve very little trading. In fact, options are assumed to be traded only once, at the beginning of each period. At the end of each period, options either expire worthless (which happens most of the time) or are exercised at known prices (with small commissions for the exercise). Because the magnitude of the mispricing of puts is so large, introducing reasonable market imperfections (trading costs, bid-ask spreads, price impact, costs associated with maintaining the margin requirements, etc.) have a relatively small effect on the average returns. The only exception might be extremely deep OTM puts. Recall, however, that we do not use very low-priced, illiquid options.
The findings reported in Section 2.3 are not specific to a particular choice of the holding period. When we repeat the previous analysis with time to maturity τ =3 months, the general findings are qualitatively similar to the case of τ =1 month. The average put returns are negative for all moneyness. For ATM and OTM puts, the results are very significant, both economically and statistically.
Related Literature
Several recent papers have documented related findings, including Jackwerth (2000), Coval and Shumway (2001) , Aït-Sahalia, Wang, and Yared (2001), Bakshi and Kapadia (2003) , and Bollen and Whaley (2003) . These papers look at different trading strategies and datasets, but the general conclusion is that puts (especially ATM and OTM) have been historically too expensive. Noteworthy, some papers use transactions data and find that the transaction costs and bid-ask spreads have little effect on monthly put returns (see Coval and Shumway (2001) , Bollen and Whaley (2003) ).
It is common in the literature to study the profitability of the so-called "crash-neutral" strategies (Jackwerth (2000) , Coval and Shumway (2001) ), where a deep OTM put is used to limit losses in the case of market crashes. For example, consider a position which is short the ATM put and long the OTM put with k = 0.90, that is, Z t = p t (0.90) − p t (1.00). The OTM put limits the downside risk, with the lowest terminal value Z T being -10% of the index's initial value v t . The position earns the same return whether the market return is -10% or -50%.
We want to point out that this approach implicitly assumes a very specific way to riskadjust future payoffs. To see this more clearly, consider strategies that have capped payoff for market declines below some critical value v c . Specifically, let Z c t denote the value of a "crash-neutral" strategy for which payoff Z c T = 0 when v T ≤ v c . (The normalization of the payoff to zero in crash states is without loss of generality when the risk-free bond is available.) The average excess return on all such strategies will be zero if and only if the pricing kernel has the form:
In other words, investors are effectively assumed to be risk-neutral over the range of values v T ≥ v c . In particular, if v c is set to 0.9v t , then investors are indifferent between payoffs received when the market return is -5% or +15%. In Section 3, we will test for these and much more general pricing kernels.
Alternative Explanations
In the rest of the paper, we will implement a new methodology to explore three explanations of the overpriced put puzzle.
E1: Risk premium
According to this explanation, high prices of puts are expected and reflect normal risk premiums under some equilibrium model. From Section 2.3.2, we know that the canonical models, such as CAPM and Rubinstein (1976) model, cannot explain the empirical findings. Still, maybe there is another, nonstandard model which can. In this true model, investors must strongly dislike crash-like returns of S&P 500 and are willing to pay considerable premiums to for puts that provide explicit insurance against market declines.
E2: The Peso problem
According to this explanation, the sample under investigation is affected by the Peso problem. 11 That is, in spite of including the October 1987 crash, investors correctly anticipated more market crashes over the 14-year period but those did not happen. In this case, the ex post realized returns of S&P 500 are different from investors' ex ante beliefs. Puts only appear overpriced, and the mispricing would have disappeared if data for a much longer period were available. Section 2.3.2 suggests that unrealized crashes are unlikely to explain all mispricing of puts. Still, it is possible that the Peso problem is responsible for a portion of the anomaly. It should be mentioned that the Peso problem is often defined narrowly to arise when the distribution of the data generating process includes a catastrophic state that occurs with a very low probability. Because this state has low probability, it may not be observed in a given small sample. Because the state is catastrophic, the possibility of this state occuring substantially affects equilibrium prices. Here, we understand the Peso problem more broadly as arising whenever the ex post frequencies of states within the data sample differ considerably from their ex ante probabilities, and where these deviations distort econometric inference. In other words, the Peso problem is present when the sample moments calculated from the available data do not match the population moments that investors use to make their decisions.
E3: Biased beliefs
According to this explanation, investors' subjective beliefs are mistaken. Similar to E2, this explanation states that the S&P 500 realized returns have not been anticipated by investors. The OTM puts were expensive because investors assigned too high probabilities to negative returns of S&P 500. Perhaps, memories of the 1987 stock market crash were still fresh and, even though the true probability of another extreme decline was small, investors continued to overstate this probability.
Model-Independent Approach
In this section, we implement the model-free methodology for testing rationality of asset pricing. We start by reviewing the new theory developed in Bondarenko (2003a) .
New Restriction on Securities Prices
Suppose that securities are traded in a frictionless and competitive market. As before, let Z t denote the value of a generic security with a single payoff Z T at time-T . The payoff Z T may be path-dependent. The risk-free rate is normalized to zero.
, and E N t [·] denote the time-t conditional expectations under the objective, subjective, and risk-neutral probability measures. The objective measure reflects the true (or large-sample) frequencies with which various events occur. The subjective measure represents investors' beliefs regarding future events. The risk-neutral measure always exists if the market 11 The Peso problem is analyzed in, for example, Bekaert, Hodrick, and Marshall (1995) .
is arbitrage-free (Harrison and Kreps (1979) ) and is unique if the market is complete (Harrison and Pliska (1981) ). However, we do not insist on market completeness. Securities prices can be computed under the risk-neutral measure as
Alternatively, prices can be expressed under the subjective measure using the pricing kernel as
The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) is characterized by two conditions: (i) rational learning, which means that, when new information arrives to the market, investors update their beliefs using the rules of conditional probability, and (ii) correct beliefs, which means that the objective and subjective measures coincide, or
. Following Bossaerts (2003), we allow for a more general case of the Efficiently Learning Market (ELM). Bossaerts argues that of the two conditions underlying EMH, it is the condition of rational learning that reflects the essence of rationality. In ELM, he maintains (i), but relaxes (ii).
Under EMH, the security's price must satisfy the following standard restriction:
To test the restriction in (6), one must pre-commit to a specific pricing kernel. As a result, empirical tests suffer from a joint hypothesis problem: rejections may emerge because the market is truly inefficient or because an incorrect pricing kernel has been assumed. Bondarenko (2003a) shows that, under certain conditions, there is another martingale-type restriction on securities prices. This restriction is stated in Proposition 1 below. In order to give our empirical findings the broadest interpretation possible, we prove a more general version of the result in Bondarenko (2003a) . Let x T denote some general state variable. Denote
as the objective and subjective expectation conditional on the final state being x. Also, denote f t (x T ), g t (x T ), and h t (x T ) as the objective, subjective, and risk-neutral densities of
denote the projection of the pricing kernel onto the final state. (For discussion of projected kernels, see, for example, Hansen and Richard (1987) , Cochrane (2001) , and Rosenberg and Engle (2002) .) The projected kernel m * t (x T ) has the property that at time-t it correctly prices securities whose time-T payoffs depend on
In what follows, we fix three dates t < s < T and study securities returns over the period [t, s] . We say that the projected kernel is path-independent if the following assumption holds. 
Assumption 1 For all histories and all
Under specification (7), Assumption 1 is satisfied trivially, because m * t (x T ) = m(x T ) for all t. However, the assumption is more general than (7). In particular, m T could depend on other state variables besides x T , or x T might be an imperfect proxy for the true state variable. We will discuss Assumption 1 in more detail in Section 4.
Proposition 1 Suppose that ELM and Assumptions 1-3 hold. Then securities prices satisfy
Two additional Assumptions 2-3 and the proof of Proposition 1 are given in Appendix B. Proposition 1 extends the main result in Bondarenko (2003a) by replacing condition (7) with more general Assumption 1. Intuitively, the restriction in (8) says the following. Suppose that an empiricist observes many repetitions of the same environment and selects only those price histories for whichx T = x. Then, in the selected histories the ratio Z t /h t (x) must change over time unpredictably. The unusual feature of (8) is conditioning on future information. The expression inside the expectation operator in (8) is not know at time-s and it could only be computed after the final state at time-T is revealed.
The scope of the new restriction is quite general. Bondarenko (2003a) argues that essentially every known equilibrium model has the property that its pricing kernel satisfies (7) for some simple state variable x T , with kernel m T depending on the state x T but not the complete history (x t : t ≤ T ) for each time-T . For example, this holds for
• CAPM and Rubinstein (1976) model for which x T = v T , where v T is the value of the market portfolio;
• the canonical consumption-based models for which x T = c T , where c T is aggregate consumption (or, a vector of several consumption goods);
• Epstein and Zin (1989, 1991) and Weil (1989) models with recursive preferences for which
• the habit formation models of Abel (1990) and Campbell and Cochrane (1999) for which
, where ω T is external habit;
• the multifactor arbitrage models for which x T is a vector of common factors.
Specification in (7) has the important implication that certain trading strategies -termed statistical arbitrage opportunities (SAOs) and defined with respect to the state variable x Tcannot exist in equilibrium. The absence of SAOs then implies the restriction in (8). Note that, for different choices of the state variable x T the restriction in (8) allows one to test different classes of equilibrium models.
Discussion
The new restriction in (8) has three important properties. First and most significantly, the restriction makes no reference to the unobservable pricing kernel. Instead, the restriction requires the knowledge of RND h t (x), which is implicit in securities prices and can be estimated if options on x T are traded. This means that the restriction in (8) can be used to resolve the joint hypothesis problem present in tests of EMH. It allows one to test whether securities prices are compatible with any equilibrium model, for which the pricing kernel satisfies Assumption 1.
Second, the restriction in (8) can be used in small samples and in the presence of selection biases with respect to x T . To see this more clearly, suppose that the empiricist has collected a dataset of price histories with final states x j , j = 1, . . . , N. As the number of histories N increases to infinity, the corresponding empirical densityf t (x T ) will approach the objective density f t (x T ). For small N , however, the empirical densityf t (x T ) might differ from f t (x T ) considerably. This will usually cause rejection of the restriction in (6), even if the true pricing kernel were known. However, because the restriction in (8) applies for every realization x T , the restriction will hold even in small samples. As another illustration, suppose that the empiricist has to use a dataset in which certain realizations x T are explicitly excluded. Specifically, suppose that the dataset only contains those histories for which x T ∈ A, where A is a subset of possible final states. Again, under such a selection bias, the restriction in (6) will normally be rejected. Interestingly, the selection bias does not affect the restriction in (8) -because of conditioning on the final outcome, the restriction holds for any subset A.
Third, the new restriction continues to hold even when investors have incorrect beliefs about distribution of x T . Specifically, suppose that investors start with expectations g t (x T ) = f t (x T ), but they update their expectations using Bayes' law and correct likelihood functions (see Assumption 2 in Appendix B). Then, the restriction in (8) must still hold.
The new restriction can be implemented in either parametric or nonparametric contexts. In the former, one builds RND h t (x) from a parametric equilibrium model. In this approach, there is no restriction on how broad and general the state variable x T could be. Although the approach will suffer from the same joint hypothesis problem that affects empirical tests based on the standard restriction in (6), the approach still could be useful. First, the new restriction offers an alternative way to test asset pricing (which has been largely overlooked in the literature). Thus, there might exist situations when the standard restriction is not rejected while the new one is. Second, the new restriction still possesses the other two important advantages (i.e., robustness to selection biases and distorted beliefs).
Still, it is the nonparametric context where the new restriction is probably the most useful. In this case, one makes no strong assumptions about the true equilibrium model/pricing kernel and estimates RND h t (x) from traded securities. This approach, therefore, is best suited to situations where the state variable x T corresponds to prices traded assets for which liquid option markets exist. In Section 3.3, we implement this approach for x T = v T , the value of the market portfolio. The restriction in (8) now becomes
The restriction in (9) holds for all equilibrium models for which the projection of the pricing kernel on v T is path-independent, or
where
. A special case of this specification is when the pricing kernel is an arbitrary function of v T :
One simple setting for which the restriction in (9) applies is the following. Consider a pureexchange economy with a finite horizon. There are one risky asset (the market) and a risk-free bond. A representative agent maximizes the expected value of utility function E t [U (v T )], with U > 0 and U ≤ 0. Since the pricing kernel in this economy is m T = U (v T ), condition (11) is satisfied. Note that this holds true no matter how complex the process for v t is (which, in particular, could include stochastic volatility, jumps, and multiple factors).
To gain some intuition for the model-free methodology, Appendix C presents a parametric example, which illustrates the properties of the new restriction in the presence of 1) riskaversion, 2) incorrect beliefs, and 3) selection biases.
Test of New Restriction
To test the restriction in (9), we first rewrite it in a slightly different form. Suppose that three dates t < s < T are fixed and let λ v := h t (v)/h s (v) denote the inverse of the return of RND evaluated at the final value v. Applying (9) to the risk-free bond Z t ≡ 1, we obtain that
In view of (12), the restriction in (9) can be expressed as
where r i = Z s /Z t − 1 is the net return over [t, s] . In this form, the restriction in (13) resembles the restriction in (4). Intuitively, the strictly positive random variable λ v plays the role of a relevant "discount factor" for the expectation E v t [·] as does the pricing kernel m for the expectation E t [·] . By taking unconditional (over time) expectations of (13), we obtain
In moment (14), time is integrated out, but conditioning on the future value is still present. Intuitively, for every possible realization v, the random variable λ v r i must have zero mean.
To test the condition in (14), we proceed as follows. As in Section 2.3, let j index option maturities T j . We again compute monthly returns r j over the holding period
That is, we consider non-overlapping monthly returns from one option maturity date to another. For conditioning on the future information, we use the next option maturity date T j+1 . Therefore,
For each holding period, we estimate two RNDs from options that mature at date T j+1 . (These options have 2 months left to maturity at the beginning of the period t j and 1 month left to maturity at the end of the period s j .) We use only those holding periods [t j , s j ] for which 1) necessary option series are available to estimate both RNDs, and 2) the final value v T j+1 falls within the lowest and the highest strikes available on both trading dates t j and s j , which ensures that accurate estimation of both h t j (v T j+1 ) and h s j (v T j+1 ) is possible. Overall, there are now 144 usable holding periods [t j , s j ].
Armed with weights λ j , we form the average weighted return (AWR)
where n is the number of available weighted returns. AWR is the sample analogue of
. The condition in (14) says that AWR should be insignificantly different from zero.
Although the expression for AWR might appear rather "conventional," it is important to reiterate that its weights are constructed by using future information. Specifically, the weight λ j depends on the value v T j+1 , not yet known at time-T j . (In probability theoretical terms, the weight λ j is a random variable which is not measurable with respect to information set at time-T j .) This means that computing AWR requires a particular look-ahead bias. This look-ahead bias would normally present a serious problem for traditional empirical tests, but the bias is the very reason why our model-free approach works.
As in Section 2.3, we focus on one-month puts with different moneyness. Specifically, we compute the return r j p (k) over the holding period [t j , s j ] on put with maturity s j , where k is moneyness on trading date t j . Table 6 reports mean, minimum, median, and maximum of weighted return λr p (k), for different k. The pointwise confidence intervals (1%, 5%, 95%, and 99%) are constructed using a bootstrap. The left panel of Figure 5 summarizes the main results of Table 6 by plotting AWR as a function of k. Also shown are the 5% and 95% confidence intervals. We find that AWR is negative for all k and that it is statistically significant at the 5% significance level for all k ≤ 1.02 and at the 1% level for all k ≤ 1.00. Since the condition in (14) must hold for many other securities and trading strategies Z t , we can test it for two additional cases: (i) r i is the return on S&P 500 futures, that is, Z t ≡ v t ;
(ii) r i is the return on a two-month put as opposed to a one-month put.
In both cases, we compute returns over the same monthly holding periods [t j , s j ] = [T j−1 , T j ] as before and use previously computed weights λ j to form the weighted return. In case (i), we find that AWR for S&P 500 is positive (AWR=0.50%). However, it is not statistically significant (t-statistics is 1.09).
Case (ii) corresponds to the rollover trading strategy that buys puts 2 months before maturity and sells them 1 month before maturity. Puts are again classified according to their moneyness on date t j with k=0.92, 0.94, ..., 1.08. The main findings can be summarized as follows. AR is negative for all k: -44%, -39%, -38%, -33%, -27%, -21%, -16%, -12%, and -11%, respectively. AR is statistically significant at the 5% significance level for all k ≤ 1.02 and at the 1% level for all k ≤ 1.00. As expected, average returns for two-month puts are less extreme than those for one-month puts. (See Table 1 .) As for AWR, it is also negative for all k: -38%, -36%, -33%, -28%, -22%, -16%, -12%, -8%, and -6%, respectively. AWR is statistically significant at the 5% significance level for all k ≤ 1.02 and at the 1% level for all k ≤ 1.00. AWR for two-month puts and the confidence intervals are shown in the right panel of Figure 5 .
Overall, the results in this section imply that no equilibrium model with a pricing kernel satisfying (10) can possibly explain the put anomaly, even when allowing for the possibility of the Peso problem and incorrect beliefs. 12
Interpretation of Results
This section discusses in more detail what possibilities are ruled out by the empirical results of Section 3.3.
Rejected Models
The results in Section 3.3 rule out the whole class of equilibrium models. In those models, pricing kernels are restricted to the form (11). At the same time, rejected models can have very general price dynamics for v t , including those with jumps and/or stochastic volatility. In other words, the empirical results make a statement about the pricing kernel, not the data generating process.
To clarify this point, let D denote the class of price processes which are supported by a pricing kernel satisfying (11), for a given horizon T . Consider a continuous-time pure-exchange economy as in Appendix C. There are a risky asset (the market) v t and a risk-free bond. The risk-free rate is to zero. Also traded are various derivative securities in zero net supply. The representative investor maximizes the expected value of U (v T ). For simplicity, we assume the CRRA preferences in (17), so that m T = v −γ T . Suppose that investors receive information about the terminal value v T represented by an exogenous process ψ t , with ψ T = v T . For any process ψ t , the price dynamics v t is endogenously derived by solving the representative investor's portfolio problem. Different choices for the process ψ t imply different processes v t . For example, suppose that ψ t follows a Geometric Brownian motion:
where µ and σ are constant. Then, v t also follows a Geometric Brownian motion:
. This is, of course, the case of the Black-Scholes model. Suppose next that ψ t follows a jump-diffusion:
where N t is a Poisson jump process with arrival intensity λ and stochastic jump size e y i . Processes B t and N t are independent. For each jump i, y i is normally distributed with mean (µ y − 0.5σ 2 y ) and variance σ 2 y . The expected jump size is µ J = e µy − 1. It follows from Naik and Lee (1990) that the equilibrium price process v t now is also a jump-diffusion:
The information arrival process ψ t can be made even more general. There could be multiple fundamental factors (including multi-factors stochastic volatility and general jumps in price and volatility). There could be arbitrary correlations between fundamental factors, and parameters could be time-varying. Obviously, such a general specification will not admit an analytical solution for the endogenously determined price process v t . However, the solution (whenever exists) can still be found via numerical methods. The price process will inherit general properties of the process for ψ t . Similar to ψ t , the price v t will follow a multi-factor process with jumps and stochastic volatility. In this setting, the objective price process, a derivative's price Z t , the risk-neutral density h t (v T ) will all depend not only on v t but other factors. Nevertheless, because the pricing kernel is m T = v −γ T , even these very flexible specifications are in the class of rejected models D. 14 Although we have focused on one utility specification, the standard CRRA preferences, the whole point is that U (v T ) could be an arbitrary function, corresponding to various preferences. Moreover, additional price dynamics in D obtain by considering alternative general equilibrium constructions (not just pure-exchange economies with terminal consumption). 14 Admittedly, the described general specifications are quite complex and intractable. However, there is no reason to believe that the true model is simple and tractable.
15 It is beyond the scope of this paper to formally characterize price processes in D. For the special case of pure-exchange economies and when vt follows a single-factor Markov diffusion, the relevant results are available in Bick (1990) and He and Leland (1993) .
Our approach also rules out equilibrium models for which the pricing kernel m T depends on other relevant state variables besides v T , provided that the projected kernel m * t (v T ) is pathindependent as stated in (10). This has two important consequences. First, since our empirical application focuses on very short horizons, many state variables identified in the theoretical literature are not likely to be important. In particular, the aggregate consumption c t and habit ω t discussed in Section 3.1 have very smooth time series at the monthly frequency, especially when compared to v t . As a result, these state variables are not able to introduce meaningful path-dependence of the projected kernel m * t (v T ). Second, many theoretical models use the market portfolio as the relevant state variable. In this paper, we approximate the market portfolio with the S&P 500 index. Although standard in the empirical literature, this approach is open to the Roll's critique. However, because Proposition 1 allows us to focus on the projected kernel m * t (v T ) instead the original kernel, we do not have to worry that the S&P 500 value v T might be an imperfect proxy of the true market portfolio.
To be able to explain the put puzzle, a candidate equilibrium model must produce a projected kernel m * t (v T ) which is strongly path-dependent, considering how little can be explained when path-independence is assumed. However, such models have not received much attention in the literature. In particular, currently there is no accepted general equilibrium model where the representative investor's utility function U (·) explicitly depends on stochastic volatility.
Peso Problem and Mistaken Beliefs
In addition to rejecting the broad and important class of price dynamics, the results in Section 3.3 also rule out the explanations E2 and E3. No previous paper has studied the combined effect of risk-aversion, selection bias, and mistaken beliefs. To see why this is significant, consider the parametric example in Appendix C. The example assumes the CRRA preferences with γ = 4 and a single-factor diffusion for v t . It demonstrates that, for an arguably plausible combination of risk-aversion, mistaken beliefs, and the selection bias, it could be possible to produce a realistic mispricing of puts, where the mispricing is about of the same magnitude and shape as that observed empirically (see Figure 6) .
At this point, one might even incorrectly conclude that the put puzzle is solved, for a simple and parsimonious model can achieve almost a perfect fit to the data. However, the candidate "solution" does not survive a test of the new restriction. When the new restriction is applied, the mispricing in the parametric example "disappears", while the mispricing in the data does not. This means that the mispricing in the data is of different origin and is not due to risk-aversion, beliefs, and the selection bias.
In this respect, our paper offers two important insights. First, the biggest problem with put options is not the magnitude of the mispricing -a very substantial mispricing could be generated in plausible settings with reasonable parameters. Instead, the real puzzle is intertemporal inconsistency of put prices, as evidenced by the rejection of the new restriction. The latter is equivalent to saying that there exist statistical arbitrage opportunities. Second, to falsify spurious "solutions" of the put puzzle, one might need to test the new restriction. Even though a lot of flexibility can be achieved by varying preferences, beliefs, and selection bias, still, securities prices cannot be completely arbitrary and have to respect the new restriction.
Not Rejected Partial-Equilibrium Models
Although the class of rejected price dynamics is quite rich, we want to make it clear that there are also many models that are not in this class. Important examples are models of Heston (1993) , Hull and White (1987) , Bates (2000) , and related models. It is important to point out that all these models are partial equilibrium (PE) models. As a primitive assumption, they assume a parametric price dynamics for v t as well as market prices of various risk factors. These models do not address the issue whether the assumed price dynamics could be supported by some economically sensible preferences of the representative investor. Because price dynamics could be essentially arbitrary, pricing kernels in PE specifications do not usually satisfy (11).
As reduced-form approximations, PE models can be very useful in some applications. In particular, they can be used for hedging and for valuing exotic options consistently with standard ones. However, as explanations for asset pricing anomalies (such as the equity premium puzzle or the put puzzle), PE models are unsatisfactory. Suppose that one finds a PEM with multiple parameters/factors which can be calibrated reasonably well to data. Still, this does not answer many important questions: Why are certain state variables of special hedging concern to investors? Why are certain risks priced in the fist place? What are economically reasonable values for market prices of various risks? 16 The ultimate challenge is to be able to explain historical put prices in a general equilibrium (GE) setting. Intuitively, our approach focuses on the important class of price dynamics/pricing kernels which could be rationalized by some sensible preferences in a GE context. Still, because of popularity of PE models in applied research, it might be useful to be able to test these models as well. Can our methodology help to rule out pricing kernels of PE models? We believe so.
Observe that the new restriction is rejected by the option data at a high confidence level. Intuitively, this means that a pricing kernel m T whose projection onto v T is only "slightly" path-dependent cannot justify the data. To formalize this intuition, we can introduce a measure d = d(m T ), which for a given kernel m T quantifies its degree of path-dependence with respect to v T . When d = 0, the new restriction in (13) holds exactly. When d is nonzero, the maximum possible violation of the restriction in (13) is bounded by d. (This is somewhat in spirit of Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) , who derive bounds on the pricing kernel's Sharpe ratio.) We are currently pursuing this direction of research. Preliminary results, in particular, indicate that the projected pricing kernel in the Heston model is not sufficiently path-dependent to rationalize historical put returns.
Implications for Option Pricing Literature
The results in Section 3.3 have important implications for the option pricing literature. In particular, the results strongly reject the specification in (11), the assumption that plays a central role in many theoretical and empirical papers.
Consider, for example, a recent theoretical paper by Câmara (2003) . He extends the general equilibrium models in Rubinstein (1976) and Brennan (1979) to more flexible distributional assumptions. Specifically, Câmara characterizes a whole class of infinitely many general equilibrium models for certain families of utility functions and the joint dynamics for the aggregate consumption and the market portfolio. However, all pricing kernels in his approach come out in the form m T = exp(g(v T )), for a general function g (·) . This means that none of these general equilibrium models could be consistent with the results in Section 3.3.
Our results also present a challenge to the fast-growing strand of the empirical literature which uses option prices to extract the implied risk-preferences. Several recent papers, including Aït-Sahalia and Lo (2000), Jackwerth (2000) , and Rosenberg and Engle (2002) , develop such methodologies. These papers also present important applications. In particular, Aït-Sahalia and Lo propose to use estimated preferences in risk management by introducing the new concept of economic value-at-risk, or E-VaR.
While there are some variations, all methodologies essentially consist of three main steps: 1) estimate the risk-neutral density h t (v T ) from option prices, 2) estimate the objective density f t (v T ) from the underlying process, and 3) interpret the ratio h t (v T )/f t (v T ) as the marginal utility of the representative investor. Specifically, Aït-Sahalia and Lo (2000), Jackwerth (2000) , and Bliss and Panigirtzoglou (2003) assume that the representative investor maximizes the expected value of the utility function U (v T ). Under this assumption, the pricing kernel m T satisfies (11) and
is equal to the marginal utility U (v T ) (times a constant). Thus, the relative risk aversion function can be computed as
Some anomalous findings have been reported. In particular, Jackwerth documents that, for a sizable range of wealth levels, investors seem to exhibit risk-seeking behavior, i.e., the pricing kernel m(v T ) is increasing instead of decreasing and γ(v T ) < 0. Some authors refer to this finding as the "pricing kernel puzzle." The results in Section 3.3, however, suggest that the pricing kernel puzzle might be spurious, in the sense that it could be an artifact of the incorrect assumption. Stated differently, the pricing kernel puzzle is a puzzle only if the assumed specification in (11) is satisfied, which we now know is not true. Rosenberg and Engle (2002) follow a similar empirical methodology but offer a broader interpretation. They do not rely on the specification in (11) and allow the pricing kernel m T = m(v T , y T ) to depend on other state variables y T . In this case, the ratio h t (v T )/f t (v T ) is no longer the pricing kernel, but instead is the projected kernel m * t (v T ). Using the projected kernel, Rosenberg and Engle define the projected relative risk aversion function as 17
They estimate two parametric specifications for the projected kernel, one of which produces the projected kernel which has similar characteristics as those reported in Jackwerth (2000) . That is, there is a sizable region where the projected kernel is increasing and thus γ * (v T ) is negative. Does it, however, mean that investors are sometimes risk-seeking? Not necessarily. If the projected kernel m * t (v T ) is strongly path-dependent, which we have established in Section 3.3, then the projected risk aversion γ * (v T ) could be very different from the true risk aversion γ(v T , y T ). In particular, it is possible to construct an example where a) the representative investor has classical von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences with utility function U (v T , y T ), where U v > 0 and U vv < 0 for all v T and y T ; b) for all v T and y T , the relative risk aversion function γ(v T , y T ) takes reasonable values, say, between 2 and 5; and c) the corresponding projected relative risk aversion function γ * (v T ) is negative for some values of v T . 18 To summarize, one important implication of our paper is that the proposed methodologies, despite their considerable popularity, might be inappropriate for estimating risk-preferences and might produce misleading results. The issue here is not so much the fact of the rejection of the specification in (10) per se. After all, every theoretical assumption is only an approximation. Instead, the main issue is the extent of the rejection. Our results suggest that the specification in (10) is grossly violated, in which case the ratio h t (v T )/f t (v T ) cannot be interpreted as the marginal utility for the representative investor, even approximately. This important topic warrants further investigation.
Conclusion
In this paper, we implement a novel methodology to test rationality of asset pricing. The main advantage of the methodology is that it requires no parametric assumptions about the unobservable pricing kernel or investors' preferences. Furthermore, it can be applied even when the sample is affected by the Peso problem and when investors' beliefs are incorrect. The methodology is based on the new rationality restriction, which states that securities prices deflated by RND evaluated at the eventual outcome must follow a martingale.
We implement the new methodology in the context of the overpriced puts puzzle. The puzzle is that historical prices of puts on the S&P 500 Index have been extremely high and incompatible with the canonical asset-pricing models. The economic impact of the put mispricing appears to be very large. Simple trading strategies that sell unhedged puts would have earned extraordinary paper profits.
To investigates whether put returns could be rationalized in a possibly nonstandard equilibrium model, we test the new rationality restriction. The required information about RND is estimated nonparametrically from prices of traded options. We find that the new restriction is strongly rejected, meaning that no model from a broad class of models can possibly explain the put anomaly, even when allowing for the possibility of the Peso problem and incorrect beliefs. In the light of our results, one might have to 1) develop a new kind of general equilibrium models, for which the pricing kernels is strongly path-dependent with respect to the market portfolio (such models are currently not available); 2) entertain the possibility that investors are not fully rational and that they commit systematic cognitive errors; and 3) question other standard theoretical assumptions (such as the absence of market frictions). Only future research will provide a better understanding of the put puzzle.
B Theoretical Assumptions and Proof of Proposition 1
There are two additional assumptions needed for the restriction in (8). Assumption 2, which is due to Bossaerts (2003) , restricts the set of possible beliefs of investors. Specifically, suppose that beliefs are partitioned into initial beliefs (priors) and beliefs conditional on the final state x T (likelihood functions). Then, initial beliefs can be arbitrary but that conditional beliefs must be correct.
Assumption 2 Investors' beliefs conditional on the final state are correct. That is,
for all x T .
Assumption 2 has the following interpretation. Over time, investors gradually learn the final state x T by observing some economic "signals". Even though investors might not know the correct distribution of final states, they nevertheless understand how the signals are generated for each x T . Assumption 1 is satisfied trivially for the standard EMH. However, EMH requires priors to be correct as well.
Assumption 3 is a technical one. It ensures that the ratio inside the conditional expectation operator in (8) is always well-defined.
Assumption 3 For all histories and all x T , the risk-neutral density
h s (x T ) > 0.
Proof of Proposition 1
The proof relies on the following two observations. First, the risk-neutral and subjective densities for the final state x T are related to each other via the projected pricing kernel as follows:
Second, for any random variable Y s (measurable with respect to information at time-s):
Therefore, for any security
where we have used Assumptions 1-3, facts (15)- (16), and condition
C Parametric Example
This appendix illustrates our model-independent approach with the help of parametric example. In a tractable model, the example allows one to study the properties of the new restriction in the presence of 1) risk-aversion, 2) incorrect beliefs, and 3) selection biases. As a special case, the example produces the Black-Scholes model. (All technical details are collected in Appendix D.)
C.1 Economy
Consider a continuous-time finite-horizon economy. There is one risky asset, whose price is v t . The riskfree rate is zero. A representative investor maximizes the expected value of the utility function U (v T ). Also traded are various derivative securities in zero net supply. As a state variable, it is convenient to use log of the asset's price x t = log v t . We assume that x T is normally distributed. Specifically, the time-0 objective density is 
This implies that the risk-neutral density is also normal, 
where B t is the standard Brownian motion. Intuitively, an incremental signal dΨ t is normally distributed with mean xdt and variance φ
With no conditioning on the final outcome, the process for the asset's price v t can be derived as
In general, the drift in the above formula depends on initial beliefs. Suppose that (u 0 , η 0 ) = (ν 0 + (∆ + γ)σ 2 0 , σ 0 ) for some ∆. Under this specification of beliefs, the standard deviation is unbiased, while the bias in the mean is ∆σ (Clearly, the classical Black-Scholes model corresponds to the case of correct beliefs with ∆ = 0.) Remark 1. The above equation has an interesting implication. Consider an empiricist who only observes the objective process. The empiricist is unable to disentangle the effects of risk aversion and biased beliefs, because the empiricist can only observe the sum (∆ + γ), but not γ and ∆ separately. This means that the same securities prices can result from either risk-aversion or biased beliefs, or some combination of the two. In particular, the same risk premium (γ + ∆)σ can arise in any economy for which risk-aversion γ and the bias in beliefs ∆ are such that γ + ∆ = γ + ∆. (Bondarenko (2003a) discusses general conditions under which preferences and beliefs are observationally equivalent.)
C.3 Comparison of Rationality Restrictions
We now contrast the two rationality restrictions, the standard one in (6) and the new one in (9). Although these restrictions apply to all securities, we only illustrate them for standard puts.
Suppose that the period [0, s] is fixed, where 0 < s < T . Consider the put option on the asset with moneyness k = K/v 0 and maturity s. The normalized put price is p 0 (k), and the put net return over [0, s] 
be the inverse of the return of RND evaluated at the final outcome x, and let m = m s /m t . Consider the following three moments (derived in Appendix D):
− 1, 
and N (·) is the standard normal cdf.
In general, the moments I 1 and I 2 are different from zero. The only situation when I 2 = 0 is when σ * 2 0s = σ From Figure 6 , the moment I x 3 is equal to zero for all moneyness k and for all cases. The moment I 2 is zero only when beliefs are correct (case I). Recall that, to test the restriction I 2 = 0, one must specify the pricing kernel, which is unobservable in practice. Even when the true pricing kernel is available, the moment I 2 will still be nonzero if beliefs are incorrect. In particular, I 2 is negative for all k when investors underestimate the objective mean u 0 (case II), overestimate the objective standard deviation (case III), or both (case IV). The moment I 1 corresponds to the sample average return and is affected by both risk-aversion and biases in beliefs. For cases I-IV, I 1 is negative for all strikes.
Remark 2. In our analysis, we rely on the CRRA-lognormal setup only because of analytical tractability. However, the condition I x 3 = 0 will continue to hold for general utility functions U (v T ), initial beliefs, and information flow in (18).
C.4 Selection Bias
We now illustrate the new restriction in (9) in the presence of a selection bias. Let A denote a subset of final states and suppose that the empiricist has a sample of histories with x T ∈ A. For example, if
c }, then the sample only includes returns above the critical value x c . Such a selection bias may contribute to the apparent put overpricing. Very low asset's returns happen infrequently and may not be observed in a small sample. Nevertheless, since low asset's returns correspond to very high returns of OTM puts, it is possible that the omission of these observations might significantly distort the small-sample moments.
In the presence of the selection bias, the empiricist considers the following moments:
These moments can be computed as explained in Appendix D. To introduce a selection bias, we choose the cutoff value x c such that 2% of the asset's lowest returns are discarded. We plotĪ 1 ,Ī 2 , and I 3 in the bottom panels of Figure 6 , for two cases:
V. Selection bias, correct beliefs; VI. Selection bias, incorrect beliefs with biased mean and standard deviation, ∆ = 2, η 0 = 0.85σ 0 . Figure 6 shows that omitting a small number of extreme returns can generate a sizable (but spurious) mispricing of puts, especially for deep OTM puts. The figure also demonstrates that selection bias does not affect the conditionĪ 3 = 0.
Remark 3. The conditionĪ 3 = 0 will continue to hold for many other subsets A, for example,
More importantly, ex post frequencies of final states x T can deviate from ex ante probabilities f 0 (x T ) in an arbitrary way and, still, the restriction in (9) must hold.
D Technical Details for Parametric Example
This appendix provides technical details for the parametric example in Appendix C. In derivations, the following basic properties of normal densities are used repeatedly.
P1:
For example, the pricing kernel m t can be derived from property P1 as
D.1 Derivation of Moments I 1 , I 2 , and I
We first derive the objective density f (x s , s; x 0 , 0). Let f (x s , s; x 0 , 0, x T , T ) denote the objective density of x s conditional on both x 0 and x T . From
we obtain that
Therefore,
Similarly, the risk-neutral density h(x s , s; x 0 , 0) = n(x s ; ν 0s + x 0 , σ 2 0s ), and the normalized price
Finally, the condition I x 3 = 0 follows from the general result in Bondarenko (2003a) . Alternatively, it can be verified directly as follows. By property P2,
D.2 Derivation of MomentsĪ
The momentsĪ 1 andĪ 2 can be computed by numerical integration. The following approach allows us to reduce a two-dimensional integration to a one-dimensional one. We assume that
Using the expression for G(ν s ), we can now integrate numerically the following expectations:
Finally, since I xT 3 = 0 for all x T , we immediately obtain thatĪ Notes: Sample Period is 08/87-12/00. Statistics are reported for monthly returns of puts with different k and the underlying S&P 500 futures. Net returns are in excess of the risk-free rate and computed over 1 month period prior to the maturity date; n is the number of observations. SR is the Sharpe ratio, T M is the Treynor's measure, M 2 is M-squared. For Jensen's α, asterisk ( * ) denotes significance at the 1% level.
"Implied γ" is the coefficient of relative risk aversion in Rubinstein (1976) model that is required to justify realized returns. 20 n/a 5.21 4.27 3.46 2.44 2.00 1.69 -0.14 0.28 1990: 07/20-08/17 n/a n/a 7.25 5.40 3.94 2.22 1.75 -0.10 0.14 1994: 03/18-04/15 n/a n/a 3.94 3.17 1.98 1.20 0.98 -0.05 0.11 1998: 07/17-08/21 n/a 6.39 5.46 4.03 2.78 2.06 1.56 -0.09 0.14 Notes: Table reports on five holding periods that correspond to the highest put returns in the sample. Sample Period is 08/87-12/00. Also reported is return on the underlying S&P 500 futures. Returns are in excess of the risk-free rate. The last column is (annualized) one-month ATM implied volatility, computed at the beginning of each holding period. Notes: Sample Period is 08/87-12/00. Statistics for monthly weighted return λr p (k) are reported for onemonth puts with different strike-to-underlying ratio k = K/v t ; n is the number of observations. Return r p (k) is in excess of the risk-free rate and is computed over one-month holding periods [t, s] prior to the option maturity date s. The weight λ = h t (v T )/h s (v T ) is the inverse of the return on RND evaluated at the realized future value of the underlying v T , where T -s is one month. The confidence intervals (1%, 5%, 95%, and 99%) are constructed using a bootstrap with 1000 resamples. The sample period is 08/87-12/00. The average statistics are computed for different strike-to-underlying ratio k = K/v t , when the number of days to maturity τ is 1 to 28 (total of 3,103 trading days), 29 to 56 (total of 3,137 trading days), and 57 to 84 (total of 3,109 trading days), respectively. In November 1997, the contract multiplier for the CME options was reduced from 500 to 250. Therefore, to calculate average trading volume and open interest, the number of contracts before November 1997 is multiplied by 2. 
